When learning to achieve a goal through a complex series of actions, humans often group several actions into a subroutine and evaluate whether the subroutine achieved a specific subgoal. A new study reports brain responses consistent with such ''hierarchical reinforcement learning.''
To culinary novices like ourselves, it seems something of a miracle that the chocolate soufflé came into existence. Baking a good soufflé requires so many complex steps and processes (http:// www.bbcgoodfood.com/recipes/2922/ hot-chocolate-souffl-) that, at first glance, it would seem to be an impossible art to perfect. When the first soufflé failed to rise, how did the chef know, for example, whether the ganache was under-velvety, or the crè me patisserie over-floury? Current theories of how the brain learns from its successes and failures offer scant advice to the budding soufflist. However, in this issue of Neuron, Ribas-Fernandes and colleagues (2011) demonstrate neural correlates of a learning strategy that dramatically simplifies not only this important problem, but also nearly every realworld example of human learning.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a central feature of human and animal behavior. Actions that result in good outcomes (termed rewards or reinforcers) are repeated more often than those that do not, increasing the likely number of future rewards. This simplistic form of learning can be ameliorated by keeping an estimate of precisely how much reward can be expected from any given action (an action's value). Now, high-value actions may be repeated more frequently than low-value ones, and, when outcomes are different from what was expected, action values may be updated to drive future behavior. This difference between received and expected reward is termed the reward prediction error (RPE) and is thought to be a major neural substrate for learning and behavioral control. Dopamine neurons in the primate and rodent midbrain show firing rate changes that appear remarkably consistent with prediction error signaling: firing rates increase when a reward is better than expected and decrease when worse than expected (Schultz, 2007) . In rodents, causal interference with these neurons induces artificial learning (Tsai et al., 2009) . In human imaging studies, it is also possible to find midbrain predictionerror signals (D'Ardenne et al., 2008) , but, for technical reasons, such signals are more commonly found in dopaminoceptive regions in the striatum (O'Doherty, 2004) and prefrontal cortex (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008) .
RL has had a tremendous impact on cognitive neuroscience due to its power in explaining behavioral and neural data. However, in the real world, simple actions rarely lead directly to rewards. Instead, the pursuit of reward (or soufflé ) often requires many actions to be taken, each depending on the last. In such a world, it is a complex problem to understand how learning should occur when an outcome is different from expected (the soufflé won't rise), as it is not clear which actions or combinations of actions should be held responsible for a prediction error, and therefore which should be adjusted for the next attempt. Solving this problem using a standard RL approach becomes exponentially more difficult as the number of actions increases. Learning to cook a soufflé would seem an intractable problem! In a complex world, then, standard RL approaches suffer because it is difficult to evaluate intermediate actions with respect to the final outcome, because they cannot distinguish one type of error from another, and because the number of possible actions they might choose from is immense. It is clear, however, that humans have more sophisticated strategies in their learning armory. One such strategy, well known to both computer scientists and chefs, is termed hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL; Botvinick et al., 2009) . Here, sequences of actions may be grouped together into subroutines (''make a ganache'' or ''whip some egg whites''). Each of these subroutines may be evaluated according to its own subgoals, and if these subgoals are not met, they will generate their own prediction errors. These pseudo-reward prediction errors (PPEs) are distinct from reward prediction errors because they are not associated with eventual reward, but with an internally set subgoal that is a stepping stone toward the eventual outcome. Hence, in a hierarchical framework, RPEs are used to learn which combinations of subroutines lead to rewarding outcomes, whereas PPEs are used to learn which combinations of actions (and sub-subroutines!) lead to a subgoal. Because they may only be attributed to the small number of actions in the subroutine, PPEs substantially reduce the complexity of learning (Figure 1 ): if the egg whites are droopy, it cannot be the chocolate's fault! It is the neural correlates of these PPEs that form the focus of Ribas-Fernandes et al. (2011) . Here, we suspect mainly for practical reasons, subjects were not asked to bake soufflé s in the MRI scanner. Instead, they performed a task devised in the world of robotics to probe HRL. Using a joystick, participants navigated a lorry to collect a package and deliver it to a target location. In this task, there is one final goal (delivery of the package to the target), which can be split into two subroutines (driving to collect the package and transporting the package to the target). Ingeniously, in some trials the experimenter moves the package such that the distance to the subgoal (the package) will change but the overall distance to the eventual target will remain the same. This causes a PPE with no associated RPE (as the subject may be further from the package but is equally far from eventual reward). In other trials, the experimenter again moves the package, but now to a spot selected such that distances to both subgoal and target remain the same, eliciting neither type of prediction error. Hence, by comparing neural activity between these trial types, the authors are able to isolate responses caused by PPEs.
How, then, would the brain respond to a pseudo-reward prediction error? A number of possibilities seemed reasonable. Hierarchical organization is already thought to exist in the lateral prefrontal cortex, with more rostral regions representing more abstract and temporally extended plans (make ganache) and more caudal regions executing more concrete and immediate actions (snap chocolate bar) (Koechlin et al., 2003) . Might hierarchical PPE mechanisms utilize this existing hierarchy? Alternatively, representations of specific goals and outcomes can be found in the ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal (Burke et al., 2008) cortices. Might these same regions update subgoal representations? In a series of three experiments, the authors demonstrate activity that is instead consistent with a third hypothesis: neural responses to pseudo-reward prediction errors show remarkable similarity to familiar RPE responses.
Using EEG, previous studies have shown RPE correlations in a characteristic midline voltage wave termed the feedback-related negativity (FRN; Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007 ). In the current study, this same negative deflection can be seen in response to a PPE. The source of the FRN is often assumed to lie in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and, when the hierarchical task is taken into the MRI scanner, PPE-related activity is indeed found in the ACC BOLD signal (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011) . While reward prediction errors can be found in single-unit activity in the ACC , the current observation by Ribas-Fernandes et al. (2011) that pseudo-rewards, as well as fictive rewards (Hayden et al., 2009) , cause similar activity requires a theory of ACC processing that goes beyond simple reward-and-error processing. One suggestion is that activity in the region is more concerned with behavioral update caused by the outcome than caused by the reward prediction error per se (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008) .
Further similarities can be found in subcortical structures. PPEs, like RPEs, are coded positively in the ventral striatum and negatively in the habenular complex. Although it is not yet clear whether the reported PPE activity recruits the dopaminergic mechanisms famous for coding RPEs, this latter finding makes it a likely possibility. Cells in the monkey lateral habenula not only code RPEs negatively, but they also causally inhibit the firing of dopamine cells in the ventral tegmental area (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007) .
The data presented in Ribas-Fernandes et al. (2011) therefore raise the possibility that prediction error responses at different levels of a hierarchical learning problem recruit the same neuronal mechanisms. Previous theories have considered the role of dopamine in learning from rewarding events. It is now likely that these same mechanisms can control the learning of complex internal goals and subgoals. As we move to more complex models of learning, the potential for common prediction error mechanisms places strong constraints on the types of models that should be considered. However, this idea immediately raises a new problem. How In conventional reinforcement learning (A), the agent goes through all steps until the final goal is reached. If the soufflé is worse than expected, any of the actions may be to blame. The learning problem can be drastically simplified by hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL, B). In this example, the agent learns three subroutines (SR1-SR3). Each of these subroutines leads to its associated subgoal (SG1-SG3). If one of the subgoals is not achieved, only the three candidate actions of the corresponding subroutine need to be evaluated. does the brain know which level of the hierarchy has generated the error? Theoretically, RPEs and PPEs can be generated by the same event, even in opposite directions. Should the value of the action or the value of the subroutine be updated? This question is left unaddressed in the current study, but an intriguing possibility is that the hierarchical organization in the prefrontal cortex can solve this problem in concert with the striatum. Striatal circuits may gate error signals to the appropriate prefrontal cells (Badre and Frank, 2011) . By arranging actions and combinations of actions into a hierarchy, and by introducing intermediate subgoals, HRL can explain complex behaviors that cannot be explained by more traditional learning theories. Not only is learning dramatically simplified, but also subroutines can be transferred between learning problems. Egg-whisking skills perfected during soufflé baking may prove useful for tomorrow night's lemon mousse. More prosaically, the complex sequence of muscle commands required, for example, to move a limb may be combined into a single subroutine (or action!) and used in a wide variety of situations. However, humans also exhibit behavioral flexibility that cannot be explained by HRL strategies. For example, if an apple falls from a tree on a windy day, the next day we might shake the tree and expect another to fall, even if we have never shaken a tree before. If the soufflé is burnt, it is more likely due to too much time in the oven than to too much chocolate in the ganache. This type of learning relies on a causal understanding (or model) of the world and our interactions with it and is also a major recent focus in behavioral neuroscience (Daw et al., 2011) . It is hoped that by studying such strategies both separately and in combination, modern neuroscientists will make big strides toward understanding the determinants of human behavior.
